




IMPARTIAL
REFLECTIONS
UPON THE
Present STATE of AFFAIRS.



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UPON THE

Present STATE of AFFAIRS.

WITH

INCIDENTAL REMARKS

UPON

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In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

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weigh the Reasoning ; and advert to Facts.

BOLINGBROKE.

LONDON :

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REFLECTIONS

ON THE

PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.

BY

JOHN B. BOWEN.

1844

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By J. B. Bowen.

1844.

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IMPARTIAL REFLECTIONS, &c.

IT is, Sir, to your candor that I submit the following justification of the opinion of numbers besides myself, upon the public affairs ; a justification which is, in some measure, extorted by the appellation of fool or knave, so politely bestowed on all who presume to refuse their admiration to the great man, or to his political conduct, to his invincible constancy, and even to his profound disinterestedness. All I intreat of you, if you deign to afford the following sheets a perusal, is a suspension of prejudice ; impartiality is what a reader owes, at least, to himself, as much as a writer owes it to both the reader and himself. That vul-

gar passion of a pre-determination against a just conviction, is not surely the characteristic of a lover of reason and truth : and such I take it for granted you are, or the addressing my sentiments to you would be labor knowingly lost. At the same time I am so far from deprecating your scorn and indignation, should you have just cause to think that I am designedly employing those sacred names of reason and truth for covers to sophistry and falsehood, that in that case I bespeak their falling on me with redoubled weight.

And now, without farther preface, allow me to lead you back to that celebrated, or, to express myself with more propriety, to that infamous epoch, when it was impossible to despise more than it deserved, the imbecillity of a ministry, and the consequent damage and dishonor to the nation from the faint, inadequate manner, in which our war was conducted : when to point out the uttermost bathos into which we were sunk, it may suffice to observe that an island, I repeat it, an island, belonging to us a maritime power, indisputably superior in naval strength as well as in many others to our enemy, was shamefully lost, after such
a precedent

a precedent manifestation of preparatives and menaces from that enemy, as aggravated, beyond measure, the infamy of our loss.

It was then, no wonder, that the nation alarmed in good earnest, at so shocking an event, should look out for some defenders of its deserted or betrayed interest. In this impatience, it was natural, though perhaps not quite so wise, to take the readiest.

There was then a man who had once before made a figure in the opposition to court-measures, which opposition he had quitted for that valuable consideration, called a post, and quitted it with such a quickness of turn and conversion, as not to keep the measures of common decency either with the public, or with himself, after which he for a number of years ran as tame and mute along with the ministerial pack, as the most thoroughly broke of them all, however *strange* he might always look upon them. Upon this occasion, however of the national distress, nothing could be easier than to foresee that the actual management of things could not long hold out against the cla-

mors of a people roused, exasperated, and never famous for their tame endurance of palpable mismanagement. Neither did it require any very deep reach of policy to imagine that a show of concern for the public good, might advance a private interest, by the acquisition of popularity.

As to any objection to a person re-assuming the part of a patriot, after having before deserted it, you will see by the subjoined note * that it has been long a settled

* “ Whoever is but qualified with *impudence* enough
 “ to back his *ignorance*, and enable him to become a
 “ *SMALL orator*, he presently expects his *retaining fee*,
 “ and *till* he has received it, is *implacable*. As soon as
 “ he *has* it, like a *regenerate* man, his eyes are *opened* pre-
 “ sently, and he puts off the *old man*, and has *NEW*
 “ *thoughts*, and *opinions* and *judgments*, as if he had lived
 “ *before* in *error* and *darkness* all his life-time. Of these
 “ there are not more at a time than a dozen or twenty
 “ at most who *govern* all the rest of the house by *com-*
 “ *bining* together and *seconding* one another, and *study-*
 “ *ing* every man his *PART*. By which *arts* they can
 “ easily prevail upon the greater number of the house,
 “ who only come as *spectators*, not to *act* but *look on*,
 “ and cry up or down all that they see *others* do, whom
 “ they have chosen for their *proxies*. And as these
 “ *grandees* as they call them, are *taken off* with *bribes* or
 “ *preferment*, others *start up* in their room, and keep
 “ the party on foot, who, if there was nothing to be
 “ *got* by it, would give it over themselves. But when
 “ this kind of *juggling* is rendered the *readiest* way to
 “ advancement,

settled point in this country, that a patriot is entitled to the privilege of a Turkish *santon* or *dervisch*, who, when arrived to a certain degree of perfection, can no longer *sin*: nay the most flagrant enormities are imputed to him as righteousness. And indeed, it has been evidently proved that modern patriotism has in this the advantage of those stale tricks of pricking in the belt or guinea-dropping, that whereas these will still hardly

“ advancement, and that nothing is more common than
 “ to see those who have *done their exercises best* in those
 “ *liberal arts* in the house of commons, to be always
 “ promoted to the house of lords, there will never
 “ want *proficients*, and those of the *worst men*; while
 “ princes *re-ward those best who serve them worst*, and trust
 “ none with the greatest charges of the nation, but
 “ only such as have *forced* their way by opposing the
 “ interest † of king and people, that can give no security
 “ rity for their *faith* and *integrity*, but the PERFIDIOUS-
 “ NESS of those courses which they took before to put
 “ themselves into a capacity of preferment. And this
 “ indeed has for some years been reputed the TEST of
 “ mens *parts* and abilities, by which they only can *de-*
 “ *serve* to be either *trusted* or employed; as if TREACH-
 “ ERY was like the SMALL-POX, which every man is to
 “ expect one time or other, and those who have had it
 “ are FREE for ever after.” BUTLER’S *Remains*.

N.B. † How much more foul is the case where the opposition by which a man *forces* his way into power, and deserts that opposition afterwards, has been not to the interest of king and country, but in favor of it?

pass

pass twice on the veriest country-boobies that have been once taken in by them, and especially if practised by the same sharper, there are numbers that the oftener they have been bit by a mock-patriot, seem but the keener for being bubbled again, by him.

The *great man* then who, to do him but justice, appears to have taken pretty right measure of the "*credulity*" of those he had to deal with, once more stood forth, and once more donning the patriot buskins, rent the roof with rants against the ruinous tendency to both king and country, of such measures as linked us too closely to the continent, or could occasion the sacrifice of British treasure and blood to foreign interests.

This was a subject upon which there could be no hyperbole, no oratorical exaggeration. The most bold figures of speech were even beneath reality. That this speech-maker then could persuade, others of so self-evident a truth, as that of the destructiveness of continental measures, is not the wonder. The wonder is that any Briton, in a point of such intuitive clearness, should need any persuasion at all. But the much greater wonder

wonder yet was that the very individual identical man, who, in the memory of numbers present, had but a few years before with all the powers of a kind of bow-wow eloquence barked himself into a place, by railing against continental connexions, should not only be listened to with common patience, should not only procure admirers and adherents, but even out-brazen his colleagues of that old faction or leaven, who, had they had nothing to reproach to him, but his ever having accepted a consideration for joining them at all, would have had enough to have silenced one of a less unembarrassed countenance.

The noise however that he made within doors soon got without, and had even a greater effect than his most sanguine wishes ought to have presumed. It was enough for the good people of Britain that there was at length one man standing forth, with power of face and lungs, to stem that torrent of corruption, through which all the British interest and even honor were actually sacrificed to a foreign avarice, so amazingly blind, as not to see that the money of which we were robbing ourselves to glut it, could only purchase its
OWN

own destruction as well as ours. In a transport shew of joy and gratitude the people did not stand to examine scrupulously from what quarter this puff of fair wind came, but hailed it with all the acclamations of zeal and genuine patriotism. We shall soon see this popularity openly carried to the old market, and the man who without it, could nothave been worth half-a-crown to his purchasers, traffic for a place, and sell both himself and the credulous people who had trusted him for other ends and more virtuous purposes, in a manner that added one instance more to the numbers with which history abounds, of the power of little things to produce great events.

But first let us review the procedure of the old faction. The whole year of 1757 had elapsed in the most scandalous inactivity. None of the court-undertakers with all their most ready and servile willingness to comply with the reigning humor of the court for involving the nation in the embroils of the continent, on any pretence that might but bring or keep the Hanoverians and Hessians on our pay-book, had so much as dared to think of sending our troops to Germany, deterred especially

especially by the clamor for which they imagined such a step would give a handle to the real or pretended patriots. The dilemma was embarrassing : they could not well keep their footing at court, without carrying that main-point of having the Germans accepted for stipendiaries, a point to which those points of exporting our own troops, and of involving us in a quarrel in which we had nothing to do, with the best part of Europe, as well as with our best friends, were but subordinate and sacrificed considerations : and, at the same time, they deservedly stood so low in the opinion of the people, that they could not take upon themselves a step so thoroughly disgusting to the nation, as that of plunging it into a continental war, especially where the part we were to take in it must be in favor of a natural friend to France, against a natural enemy to France, however a momentary occasion might have changed the permanent system of those courts, in respect to each other, and change it, perhaps, greatly, through our own fault and impolicy.

In this awkward situation were the members of that blessed old faction, which
C in

in virtue of its powers to corrupt and of its devotedness to the court, in one unnatural point, upon the modest condition of their governing in all the rest, had long maintained the glorious prerogative of awing their master, and ruining their own country. But out of this maze, in which their own total want of all genuine sound politics, had bewildered them, the glory of delivering them, was reserved for a hardy adventurer in a cap-a-pee brazen armour, and who owed all his powers to serve them, to the people's opinion that he despised them as heartily, as all his speeches since his last bursting out against the court, would have led any that did not know him to believe.

But with all that imbecility which he had perhaps not wrongfully attributed to the court-party, of that time, the event shewed that they knew admirably well how to make him their tool. But for them not to plume themselves too much on this piece of management; they need only consider two points; *the first*, that the steps to which they wanted the sanction of his popularity were sovereignly destructive of the good of their country, which was, in them, the greater madness, for

for that some of them had a large stake in it; the *second*, that their plan of employing such a tool is not absolutely a new one, as the subjoined note will shew, on the subject of princes having unnational points to carry*.

This untriumphable point then they carried: and as, for their own ends and special purposes, that person could hardly have too much popularity, while he should continue to do that work they wanted him to do, and which they had neither spirit nor influence enough to dare to take upon themselves, it was no wonder that all their

“* Finding that other men of *fortune* and *figure* would
 “rather *obstruct* than *promote* their intentions, they thought
 “it more conducive to their ends, to be served by another
 “sort of people, and did therefore bring into the manage-
 “ment of their affairs all along, a set of ministers, *weak*,
 “*ambitious, light, designing, rash, unskilful in the arts of*
 “*Wise administration, and versed in nothing but craft and*
 “*tricks*; but at the head of these they had always some
 “one that was to be the FORLORN HOPE, and who
 “would venture to go GREATER LENGTHS than any of
 “his *companions*. And for this *post*, they generally chose
 “a PUSHING MAN, of a bold spirit, a ready wit, a *fluent*
 “*tongue*, obscure, and low in the world, and such an one
 “whom fortune could hardly leave in a worse condition
 “than she found him.”

DAV. *On Private Men's Duty in the Administration of Public Affairs.*

little creatures of power should take the cue from their patrons, and join to fill up that public cry, by which the virtues of the great patriot were so loudly extolled.

One would however naturally enough have imagined that a man with any head at all, must have mistrusted, at least, *their* applause, considering the quarter from which it came. He might have justly doubted of his being in the right way, if for no other reason, than his being approved by them; approved by those whom he had either greatly wronged by railing at and affecting to despise them; or they must have undergone an instantaneous change or regeneration, for him to set any great value on their approbation, and especially for him to adopt those measures which himself had treated as crimes in them, but were now miraculously to become acts of virtue and patriotism in him. And this is what the poor deluded people applauded under the specious name of UNANIMITY! Alas! little did they consider, that where one's enemies are at variance, there may be some hope; but that their *unanimity* must be an increase of danger. And in what had certain personages ever given proofs of their having ceased to be,
what

what the people had always thought them, at least in their politics and conduct, the enemies of this country? Or could he be the friend of it who joining them, went so far beyond them in the pursuit of those very measures, which even they durst not attempt; while their disposition to attempt them, was what he had specifically de-claimed against in them, as an uncontest-able mark of their enmity to this country?

To those however to whom this great man could hardly be a problem, after their having considered his first desertion on the acceptance of a place, with such a suddenness and scorn of keeping measures with common decency and common policy, as every one may remember, it could be little or no surprize to see him give the public a second proof of what he was capable of. And to say but the truth, the public deserved it: the first deception of their confidence was undoubtedly his fault, but the second theirs: excusable however in this, that no one else presenting themselves to the service of their country, they thought him perhaps better than none: perhaps too they imagined that it was not possible for a human creature
to

to repay so unmerited a confidence with another desertion.

To whom is it unknown, how, after his acceptance of his post he behaved, in consequence of that his detestation of continental connections to which he so palpably owed all his popularity and consequence? A popularity and consequence that did not however fail him, even after he had justly forfeited them, but were continued to him on account of certain events during his administration, which had a false air of *successes*, and were ascribed to him, who had little or more hand in them than the not having hindered them, and whose fault it will perhaps be found, when too late, that they were not *successes* indeed; whereas resting as they now do, upon so false a bottom, as that of our double war, they are only proofs of the excellence of a naval system of operations: while even our victories on the continent could produce us nothing, but the prolongation of a ruinous war upon it, without the possible obtainment of one valuable end, or even of honor by courage so miserably thrown away on the execution of the plans of ignorance and false policy, in the abettorship of a cause branded by
pub-

public judicial decrees, with the odious appellations of contumacy and rebellion.

Alas ! from that fatal epoch, in which there appears no reason on earth for our going such lengths in espousing the Prussian cause, except its serving for a pretext to get the German troops once more reinstated stipendaries to us under the more dignified name of allies, we might have miscarriages, we might have unfavorable accidents, but nothing could, properly speaking, give us *successes*. The inoculating us that diseased branch of a continental quarrel could at the best produce a vain shew of blossoms, but never fruit. What we call *successes* are, not improbably, worse than actual disadvantages, which might perhaps have let us see that precipice of which those successes were but the flowers that covered the brink from our sight.

A mock-statesman as incapable as the lowest of the populace, of farther views than the parade or flash of the moment, might indeed, in his false estimate of things, think he was giving wondrous proof of his abilities, in planning expeditions, the measures for some of which were taken so short, that nothing but super-human British

tish valor could have supplemented the blundering deficiency, and others were as infallible as they were obvious, from their being in our natural naval channel. But to those who looked a little deeper than the mere surface of things, even those successes wore and still wear a deplorable cadaverous aspect, from the rotten bottom given to them, by that fatal connection of the continent, which must ultimately decide of the sum of things, decide whether after being the bubbles of those successes we may not be the victims of them. And in the mean while has not that ostentation of them with which some people are so dazzled, something of the air of what is called chambermaid's play, at whist, when some novice-player hurries out at first three or four winning-cards, with great exultation, ignorant of the art of husbanding his game, and unaware of the superiority in the adversaries hand, that besides the honors is sure to give him the odd trick?

Who does not know that often in the course of a war between nations, the final victory is by no means the consequence of intermediate ones; and that successes of the second rank are so far from securing those of the first, that they are often the
very

very causes of their not being obtained? Where the true principles of policy have been deserted or sacrificed: where the issue of an undoubtedly fair national cause has been shifted from its own foundation, and made to rest upon a foreign one, at best dubious as to right, and certainly an impolitic one in the highest degree, what have we better to expect, but that we shall pay dearer yet than we have done for that perfidious glare of our most hollow successes? Can we possibly doubt it, unless we should be mad enough to imagine that it is fit and reasonable that the system of Europe should adjust itself to our humors, passions, and convenience, the very thought of which every true Briton, one should think, would rather detest and disown, as being so contrary to that spirit of liberty of commerce, and of humanity, which makes this nation the universal friend to mankind, and especially the most interested in the general pacification and welfare of Europe?

In what execration then should we not hold the propagation of such lies as those with which the British public has been so often attempted to be tricked and amused; while the supposition that such inventions

D could

could be agreeable to it, is not but the highest insult at once to their understandings and humanity? How often have not motions and preparations of war been falsely attributed to the kings of Denmark and Sardinia?—Then again the Turks are breaking into the Ukraïn:—the Czarina is dying or dead: with other fictions of this stamp; as if Britain had no hopes or resources but in the death of potentates, or in new scenes of blood, confusion, or rebellion being opened in every part of the globe. And these sentiments so hostile to universal society are imputed not only to a commercial nation, but to the most humane nation in the world!

In the mean while, it has been said that the neutral nations beheld the mighty change operated in this country by the great man's acceptance of power, with "*amazement and veneration.*"

As to "*amazement,*" there can be no doubt of our having subscribed full sufficient cause for it. Unfortunately for Britain, there existed a prince so evidently in the career of perdition, that not only his greatest well-wishers, subjects, and relations, lamented his obstinacy in embarking

ing in it, but even his *successes*, for he too had his *successes*, at first, were but the more assured pledges, if not of his destruction, at least of the utmost danger of it: while his procedure was such as would make the fairest cause a foul one, since it was publicly *detested* by our late sovereign, who did not the less join him; and it was with this very prince, that the great champion of anti-continentalism, was pleased not only to draw our ties closer than they already unhappily were; but in the manner by which the Hanoverians and Hessians were encouraged by their re-admission into our pay, (only think of who made, who countenanced this motion!) left it problematical to all Europe, on which side it was that a most sacred convention was broke. And how broke! to the dishonor of a prince of our nation who had been exposed to a superior French army, without any assistance from hence, merely for fear of the loud clamors of the very man, who afterwards, when the juncture for sending troops was incomparably more forbidding, could set his face to the sending near thirty thousand of the flower of our army, after having in express terms declared, that with his consent not a single man should ever stir upon that errand. But it seems, that, more duc-

tile at that time, he rather chose to resign himself than to resign his post. Or rather was not that resignation of himself the wretched bargain of his post? Thus our forces, which it was certainly always eligible not to export to Germany, were withheld, when there was at least a reason of dignity for letting them go, and a chance for their doing some good; whereas they were, through the inconstancy of our excellent patriot, sent when it was impossible for them to be of service either to ourselves or to our allies, or indeed to do any thing but mischief to both.

The inconstitence then of our politics with our interest might well excite the amazement of neutral nations: but it is harder to account for its not exciting our own. But may that amazement not come too late! when Britain restored to her senses can hardly fail of seeing that her treasures have been squandered away, and her blood not even over-honorably flowing, not only in a cause not her own, but while she had a most fair and just one of her own depending, of which the issue was hardly doubtful, if she would but have been true to herself.

As to the “*veneration*” of neutral nations, I likewise grant that, if by *veneration* is meant their keeping their distance, and not chusing to have any thing to do with us; to such a point, that they would hardly dare to take our money, as fond as they are of it, to connect with us, even if the bottomless pit of Germany had left us a sixpence to spare to them. There is scarcely I presume to be found among the neutral powers another Prussia, for us to ruin, by such another injudicious alliance.

And indeed the encouragement this nation has been unhappily betrayed to give to that potentate, has been so much against the interest of Prussia, that considering him in the light of the natural friend to France, from his enmity to the house of Austria, perhaps the most antigallican step in the whole war is our having, undoubtedly without designing it, contributed to the danger, and, may it not be! to the destruction of that prince. A prince whose fall or reduction either France will most probably have reason to rue; or our politics will have been the occasion of connecting her so indissolubly with Austria, that the rest of Europe will not have a little to reproach us for the highest danger to its
liber-

liberties from that union : and this is indeed what the neutral powers cannot too much confider, nor be too jealous of it.

In the mean while only confider with yourfelf what muft be the fentiments of France, allowing France to have but common fenfe, of the part we have taken in the tragedy now acting on the German theatre, for her benefit, let the cataftrophe be what it will.

If Pruffia fhould happily not be crufted, we fhall have, at an immense expence, and in confequence of our having difgufted or turned hostile to us fo many friendly powers, have preferved one, who never cared a pinch of fuff for us, before he thought he wanted us ; and whose permanent natural intereft is, for a thoufand obvious reafons, to be the faft friend of France, to whom to be fure he would not facrifice us, if a fair occafion, or the exigency of his affairs required it.

If on the other hand Pruffia fhould happen to be crufted or reduced fo low as to be no longer of any weight in the balance againft Austria, then France cannot fail of affuming to herfelf, with fome color of reafon,

reason, some merit for having, at least, made a show of co-operating to his reduction, and for a proof produce those her losses, which we are now so loudly boasting as successes ; though they will afford France so fine a handle of claim, not improbably to the Austrian Netherlands, as well as to other considerable territories of which she is already in possession, more than equivalent to all that she has lost to us, and which will be such an accession of strength to her, as may soon enable her either to recover what she has lost, or to make the holding our conquests a very bad bargain to us, at the expence of a perpetual war not with her alone, for that might not be much, nor even with Spain joined to her, but with the whole continent, or at least with the greatest part of it, which may not improbably be armed against us, in consequence of our espousal of the Prussian cause, and of our blessed continental engagements, where we are now holding the wolf by the ear ; since we can neither well quit nor well adhere to them. A system of politics this for which Britain may with as much propriety thank the *sine quo non* promoter or father of it, as France either exult at his going out of office, or mourn in sackcloth and ashes his return
into

into it. . A return at which, as things go, no one would have any right to be surprised, or indeed at any thing, unless the prevalence of reason, or of the true interest of this nation.

But as to France, I defy her with all her skill in politics, with all the impudence of her pretensions, to plan measures more likely to be ultimately of service to her and of detriment to Britain, than those which have been already pursued ; for after all, considering her miserable behaviour in the field, considering the disadvantage she has sustained in those of her colonies by which she ever got any thing, and in her maritime commerce, not entirely perhaps compensated by the prodigious increase of her inland trade, or by the supplemental intervention of neutral bottoms, I say considering all these, she could not well expect so fair a game as we have been collaterally playing into her hands, not only by the part we have taken against our ancient and natural ally, but in favor of her ancient and natural ally. She could not well expect so great an advantage should come to her, quite clear of all deductions. That would have been too good a bargain. She must have been unreasonable

able with a vengeance, if she could grudge us the joy of two or three neutral islands dropping to us, in the course of our naval superiority, or even the reduction, on her coast, of a paultry insignificant one, however affectedly dubbed with the appellation of "IMPORTANT," at the expence of so many lives, and of so much treasure; when this is all we have to show for the success of one year (1761) for more than twenty millions sterling expence: and even that success resting on a hollow foundation. Could she be otherwise than pleased to see a people, her enemies, intoxicated with such trifling and false advantages, while their attention was taken off from the incomparably greater object of her politics on the continent? What a joke must it have been to have figured to herself our prodigy of a great man, wrapped up in his own tremendous importance, out-blustering the less *clamorous* voice of sound policy, and, to the unmeaning waste of the national wealth and blood, planning expeditions as schoolboys make nonsense-verses, where nothing but the sound is consulted, the sense being out of the question.

In this light of compensation France may very well laugh at our lopping a few
E
of

of her branches, and some of them notoriously barren ones, while her root and stem have been demonstrably all the while gathering but the more vigor for that operation.

Then why was Buffy sent, why did she sue for peace? I will first presume to give my conjectures what it was he could not come for; and next upon what may have been the real views of that court in his mission; all which I humbly submit to better judgment.

In the actual disposition of things, France must have been as much her own enemy, in fact, as we are in intention, if she had entertained but so frantic a thought as that of wishing to break the ministerial UNANIMITY in that continental career which we were so self-destructively pursuing. No, her stale dividing arts she would naturally reserve for such nations as were adhering to their own natural interest, in opposition to her's, which was far from the case with us. She could not but with infinite pleasure see a boasting practitioner administering, against our complaints, a medicine very justly reckoned a specific, but joined with a mortal poison that would infallibly worse

worse than frustrate all its *success*. In this condition of treatment, what had France to do but to put up prayers in all her churches for the continuance of our employing such a practitioner; instead of her sending over a man to procure his removal, or to disunite either those that admired his practice, or could meanly acquiesce in it?

Still a disunion followed. It did so; after Buffy came, and perhaps in consequence of his coming, but not most certainly of any influence he had or could wish to have to that effect. So much the worse for France that that disunion followed at all, and for us that it happened so late, as not improbably to be too late.

Now to answer this question, why did Buffy come? This is a question easier to be answered than why he was at all admitted. There might be a hundred good reasons to be given why the court of France should wish to pass upon other nations and even upon their own subjects the appearance of seeking a peace, or rather wish not to be accused of desiring to continue the war; but there was not a single good one for her being in earnest or sincere in seeking peace. Her de-

ference perhaps, for some neutral nations whose amicable mediation she might not chuse too manifestly to slight ; her design to impose on the Turks by a step that might show them the possibility of an union among the christian powers, in order to counteract the influence of the Prussian machinations at the Port ; a satisfaction the French court might think itself obliged to give to those of its own subjects, who, loaded with taxes and hurt in their naval trade, might think the French king too stiff in his rejection of the proposals of peace made on our part after the battle of Minden : these and many other causes might be alledged for France resorting to this mean but not unexpedient artifice of proposing a congress for peace with nothing but the continuation of war at her heart.

And this was palpably plain from the moment that Buffly * was known to be the person appointed ; and that his coming was

* This little agent or what they call *chargé des affaires*, had before the last war with France grossly insulted the late king both at Hanover and in London. At Hanover, where to every representation the king was making him, he had no other answer but, “ *Mais, Sire, Monsieur de Maillebois,*” as if he had been holding a rod over a child, that

was with the consent and in concert with the queen of Hungary. Here, not to be tedious, I do not insist on the impropriety of the choice of such a little obnoxious creature, for a commission of such infinite importance that too much care could not have been taken, to send one of the greatest authority and distinction to execute it in person. Let him have all the weight, all the authenticity, those can desire who justify the admission of him at all, but let any person capable of thinking, resolve to himself the following question. Is it at all likely, (even granting the French court sincere in its desires of peace, which I am far from believing) that the queen of Hungary, circumstanced as things were in the theatre, especially of the Prussian war, was in the least inclined to acquiesce in our continuing to assist Prussia? However interested France might be in saving that monarch from absolute ruin, and consequently disposed towards a sepa-

that general being then hovering about that electorate with forty thousand men. In London, when the king asked him what news at Paris, all his answer was, "*Sire, il y gèle.*" "*May it please your majesty, it freezes there.*"—His excuse for this was yet worse than the original impertinence. He said he was *absent*, yes *absent*, while speaking to a king of England: this clerk of an office, this *commis pour les affaires etrangeres*!

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rate accommodation which might secure that point, here our brilliant successes are in the way of our dear ally. France but for them might perhaps have less regarded the opposition of Austria; but unprosperous as she has been, she sees herself forced to keep measures with that power, and to play that saving game for herself, which we have put out of her power to play in favor of our ally, whose safety she perhaps, at bottom, wishes more than we need to do. Her sending then Buffy, circumstanced as things are, may well be suspected of a concerted captiousness and artifice.

The courts of Vienna and Versailles foresaw, most probably bespoke, our answer upon that capital point of our part in the continental war, such as it has been given, and, perhaps, such as there was a fatal pre-engagement for its being given, with which they were not unacquainted. They would have been, most likely, very, very sorry it should have been other than what it was. In which case their scheme, their only scheme, in making an insidious parade of it over all Europe would have been balked.

In the mean time, it cannot be but somewhat grating to Britons, and I would
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add surprizing, but that nothing now can well be surprizing, that the printing press of the Louvre at Paris should, in the publication from it of the account of this celebrated negociation, get the start of the authoritative one at London, insomuch that a people of arrant slaves should be first served, and receive an earlier satisfaction than a nation of free born subjects; to whom it was so much more due, if but for their unbounded confidence proved by their unbounded supplies. Was it fit, was it decent, that it should be to the French government and not to our own, that the British public should be indebted for the communication of a transaction which so deeply interests us? To say nothing of the propriety there would have been in not suffering France to prepossess all Europe against us, before the counterpoison should in our representation of things be ready to oppose to it. Who does not know the force of first impressions?

As to the famous memorial, in which Buffy, at the very juncture that we have a Spanish minister here, invested with the requisite authority of a public character from his own court, pragmatically, and against all the course and forms of business, interposed demands, so foreign from the

purpose in the behalf of the Spanish nation, nothing can be plainer than by that prepared interlude, that he was sent rather to insult and solemnly banter our court than with any real design of treating for a peace. That memorial then seems purely to have been provisionally calculated for an obstacle to conclusion; in case our continental engagements had not of themselves been a sufficient one, and rendered the insistence on the other needless. Bussy was perhaps too hasty in the presentation of that memorial, prepared, as it should seem, to elude a conclusion, in case he should, against expectation, have found too great a forwardness to renounce an ally, who, on a like occasion, would scarce have been over-scrupulously tender of renouncing us.

However, if France was really sincere in that negotiation, which is surely not the most probable supposition; hard indeed is the fate of Britain to be so fettered with an ally so insignificant, so detrimental to her, and to whom all our high heroics of declaring we will support him with "*efficacy* and GOOD FAITH," can do him so little service, while they load us with an intolerable burthen of endless expence of
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all kinds, and what is worse, yet with the general odium. On the other hand, if in those overtures, of hers, she laid a snare for the answer she bespoke and wished from us, it cannot be said that Buffy has not fulfilled the capital object of his mission.

And if subordinately he was employed in creating any breach, it was not most certainly among our ministers; but between nations, between those of Britain and Spain: and it is yet far from clear that this point is not gained. And here I intreat every sensible Briton to consider whether an open rupture between this court and Spain, is not the very game that France has been, with all her arts, striving for the whole war; and if so, whether those are the enemies of their country who would wish, if possible, to parry that French blow, or those who want rashly to precipitate us into a Spanish war, while our continental one exists, of which the whole weight may perhaps fall upon us but too soon.

There are many, no doubt, who can well remember the last Spanish war. The people, with their usual ductility, when

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specious reasons are given them, had been worked up into a pitch of frenzy and outrageous clamor for a war with Spain. Nothing was dreamed of but captured galleons, Vigo expeditions, and plundering if not conquering the mines of Mexico, Peru, Potosi, &c. And yet, for all the successes a few privateers met with, which certainly did not much enrich the nation; for all our *successes*, for successes we had, the moment that our continental connections began to make us feel their oppressive weight, all our efforts were baulked. A great assembly no longer resounded with the emphatic terms of “*No search, my lords, no search:*” and that capital and primary object of the war became a sacrifice, by patriots too! to the situation of things on the *continent*; so that not a word was said of it at the famous *hostage-peace* of Aix la Chapelle, and we came to an accommodation with Spain, after having received such diminution and damages in our trade with that nation, as are not to this day repaired, and are perhaps irreparable.

But granted, that a war with Spain, considered only as a war with Spain, or with France together, is no such formidable

dable matter ; granted that we ought even, in good policy, if our hands were not too full already, to be before-hand with the Spaniards ; since, to make all fair concessions, their close concert and connections with the court of France, are undoubted truths : granted that their marine is in as weak a condition as it is represented : What does that infer ? So much the less ought the great statesman to be heard with patience in his proposals of a war, which after all may be inevitable. From him nothing can come with a worse grace. Had we not been embarrassed with the continent, there was nothing, perhaps, we ought more to have wished, braved, and even provoked, than a war with Spain, upon as much assurance as we have of its unfriendly sentiments towards us. At the commencement of this war, we were undoubtedly, in our own proper channel of a naval war, a match for both France and Spain : I go farther ; perhaps for a year or two with all Europe. But what then ? Such a situation must be too violent to last. We could not well lay our account with warring down all Europe in any reasonable time, or without some danger of our own destruction. And in the mean time, could a trading nation be supposed to

maintain or support its navy by no other trade, but what it should carry on at the muzzle of its guns, or by maritime depredations? With regard to this last article, vain, vain indeed are most likely to be the hopes, of so many of those who are now so gaunt and so eager for a Spanish war: nothing is more probable that, after so long a preparation, their schemes or arts for eluding our naval superiority, will be at, least equal, to what they were the last war; when there was very little material done in that way. One naval commander's success enriched and made him a lord; but the nation itself was no great gainer by it, on liquidating the expences of the armament. A few privateers picked up a few straggling ships; but that object was nothing comparable to the damage done to our permanent trade; to say nothing of the success of their privateers, which was not however inconsiderable.

But if a war with that nation is so desirable a point, nothing, from the present aspect of things, can be presumed more likely to come into existence: and if war is such a blessing, I fancy, we shall have our fill of it, before we have done with it.

it. The enemies to peace need not fear their wishes for the continuance of a war being balked. They will doubtless hear with pleasure, that in comparison with what is to be expected, the war seems hardly yet begun. May we not be but too soon in a condition of not being able either to make peace or war !

In the mean while, it is hardly to be imagined, that the good people of Britain will not at length grow sick of such gross impostures as, on the encouragement of what they have already swallowed, are continually attempted to be passed on them. But surely credulity has its bounds, if falsity and effrontery have none.

The people can never I hope in earnest believe that the reason alledged for a late resignation was other than a pretext, and a pretext easily seen through : while not all the annals of the history of this or any nation, can produce such strange circumstances as those which followed this step.

An anonymous incendiary letter is sent to some citizen in the clouds : the sacred secrets of the privy-council, upon a point

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“ *of the highest importance to the crown,*
 “ *and to the most essential national interests,*”
 are with the utmost indignity revealed by
 a privy-counsellor ; the name of one of
 the privy-counsellors is very frankly and
 without ceremony inserted at full length,
 while that of the writer himself, is as im-
 properly as it is unnecessarily suppressed ;
 since the contents implicitly make it im-
 possible to mistake it. And what con-
 tents ! what a stile ! what an assurance !
 Would any really great minister, do you
 think, have ever mentioned it as matter
 of complaint, or in the way of disculpa-
 tion, that he was not suffered to “ GUIDE”
 his sovereign and her council ? Could a
 PERPETUAL DICTATOR have employed a
 more impudent expression ? In short, is
 there a grain of common sense, and espe-
 cially of modesty, in the whole letter, ex-
 cept indeed in its being published without
 the name being signed to it.

To carry on this miserable farce, a name-
 less citizen takes upon him, without any
 apparent authority, to answer it in the
 name of the city ; and in this answer,
 while the memory of the city is extolled,
 it is a pity that so little is said in favor of
 their judgment. And even perhaps their
 memory

memory would not have done them an ill office, if while it was suggesting to them the treacherously flattering side of things, it had not suffered them to forget all that infinitely outweighed what they are so good as to remember. It might not have been either unwise or unreasonable to reflect, that at the very moment of this well-timed resignation, our armies and navies had been victorious in vain ; that our *successes* had so little of substance in them, that they had only made our nation less beloved, without being more feared, more esteemed, or even the more strengthened ; that the so loudly sounded gains by trade were scarce a farthing in the pound, to the actual expences, and to those which our fatal politics threaten to entail upon us ; that the French suit to us for peace was probably rather an insulting banter than a proof of their being reduced ; the French having at this very instant a far more hopeful game to play than our so gloriously “ GUIDED ” politics have left to us ; that the continental abiss of British treasure and blood had been unmeasurably widened by the very man, who might never have emerged out of his obscurity, but for his outrageous declamation against it ; that it was in the face of a most ho-

nonorable assembly declared by him, that not half a man was to go to Germany, whereas above twenty five thousand whole men have been since sent, of whom indeed it is well if the half ever come back again.

At the same time, I sincerely agree with the letter-writer, not indeed in calling people fools, and knaves, but in allowing such to be mistaken, as call the great man's resignation a *desertion* of the public. No. It was not when he went out of his office that he *deserted* the public, but precisely when he went into his office. *Then, then,* was the fatal epoch of his desertion : and it is on that epoch the people should fix their eyes ; and not on his late gentle set-down, on a downy annuity, not to mention the feather in his lady's cap.

And now, to go farther yet, in his favor than even that affectionate friend of his, the answerer of his most curious epistle : since things are so very flourishing, and since Britain is said to have reaped such immense advantages by his administration, my sincere wish is, that fifty thousand pounds a year should be settled upon him, to be duly and regularly paid him and his heirs

heirs for ever, out of such emoluments or neat profit as shall accrue, or by any fair argument from his continuance in power, be proved possible to accrue to this nation from his prodigious services. And yet I am afraid that if he was never to touch any thing but what should come to him from the produce of that fund, he would be one of the poorest private gentlemen in the kingdom; he might then indeed be driven by dint of real distress to part with his coach-horses; and the advertisement for their sale, would not need to put even his captivated admirers to the blush; his admirers whom, if they had been so many new negroes, he could not have more grossly insulted, than in that opinion of their understandings which that advertisement implies, in his supposing that it could make any other impression on them than that of the most thorough disdain of so mean and paltry an artifice.

Well! but the city returned him their lamentable thanks in form. They did so. Peace be to the city! They have their reasons, and constitute, without doubt, one of the most respectable public bodies in the kingdom. They might be willing to keep up the shuttlecock. Inwardly per-

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haps conscious of having paid worship to the unknown man, to as little purpose as the Athenians did to the unknown God, they might be sorry to think they had thrown away any thing so precious as their esteem and gold boxes, when boxes of another metal would be of more service to keep up the virtue of what is so likely to be much wanted for him, an unembarrassed countenance. In short they are men, and do not, I presume, pretend to infallibility. And few indeed are those great minds who make even a merit of confessing an error. Few consider that if truth has a wreath for those who have originally defended her, she has a much more glorious one in reserve for those who yield to her, after having combated her: and reason good: that yielding implies the most honorable as it is the hardest of all conquests, the conquest over one's self.

As for the answer to the resolution of thanks; it is as pretty a piece of cold poetical prose as a man would wish to read on a summer's day. What a turgid vein of important banter! But especially how moving, wherewith a most pindaric transition from the citizens to the military, that most gracious prince the orator is pleased
to

to deck his *victims* for sacrifice, at least, with flowers of rhetoric ! It is really a pity that that fine theatrical panegiric of “ the matchless intrepidity of the British sailors and soldiers, conducted by officers justly famed through all the quarters of the world ” should not be read at the head of the British troops now perishing with such amazing “ propriety ” in the dreary fields of Germany. It would be an admirable cordial to them, almost equal to the thanks of their German general. But, at this rate, the navy and army cannot fail of being *taken* in, as well as the good city. Well done, Mr. Bayes, “ pit, box, and gallery it, egad ! ”

I hope however we shall never more hear the names of Demosthenes and Tully prostituted and burlesqued by a nauseous mis-application. What is extant of their writings proves, I think, pretty clearly, that at least, they could write their own language. Whereas, only figure to yourself a modern orator, in the midst of a public assembly, fixing a haggard look, on one whom he suspected to have written against him, and staring at him with an air that seemed archly to say, “ *I am at you, sir* ” and then by way of an overwhelming re-

proach, bringing out, “ *I never wrote a pamphlet.*” When the whole honorable assembly might, on their own knowledge, have answered him with one voice, “ *Sir, you could not.*” No, nor half a page of common English, even in business which generally almost writes itself. *Res verba sequuntur.* But not with modern orators. Witness certain occasional specimens of writing, such for example as “ those ever
 “ memorable *secret* instructions in the pure
 “ hurlothrumbo strain, so decently and
 “ no doubt so *warrantably* published with
 “ his *majesty’s* title gutted of its vowels,
 “ prefixed to them.” Witness various letters and answers, in the stile of his declamatory jargon, affectedly pathetic, and sonorously empty. Perhaps I exaggerate. Only examine them yourself, and deny it if you can.

But now, to resume more important considerations. I have before hinted that the reason alledged for a late resignation was rather a pretext than a motive.

That a motive it could not be, the plain state of things must incontestably demonstrate. The Spaniards were it seems
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suspected, and I really believe very justly,
 of hostile intentions towards us; nay, if
 we believe that famous anonymous letter,
 they had actually done enough to draw
 upon them our immediate resentment. I
 will not even deny that. But once more,
 what then? so much the worse for whoever
 could be justly accused of his measures
 being the cause why the privy counsellors
 were against a precipitate declaration of
 war. They might have many reasons for
 fighting Spain at her own weapon of tem-
 porizing, and for winking hard at her
 known partiality to France. They might
 not chuse to imitate the example set them
 by the Prussian hero, of too rash an ag-
 gression, or of but the appearance of an
 aggression. Spain as only connected with
 France they might hold as cheap as the
 great projector of expeditions himself may
 himself affect to do: there might even
 more be got than lost by a war with her,
 if the war rested singly on the British bot-
 tom. But as things stand on the continent
 (and whose fault is it that they stand so?)
 might not it be rather rash, prematurely
 to plunge headlong into another war: or
 is there that step in the world to be taken
 that could give France more joy? Then
 indeed Buffy might not be said to have
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come over in vain. But, with such an overload of debt as has been incurred since the commencement of this "*arduous*" war; and if not with some diminution of the live-force of this country, at least with the already such multiplied calls for its dispersion as can hardly be afforded out of the numbers of ovr population; are the members of the privy council to be insulted, or to have the mob raised upon them for pausing, for scrupling to embark the nation farther in a war to which already they see no end? But with what inexpressible scorn and indignation must the proposal be heard by them from the very man whose striking so deep into those continental measures he had so often detested or espoused, just as he happened to be in or out of place, might be so justifiably a cause of their demur? Might they not have unanimously said to him, with infinite truth and propriety? "Yourself, sir, yourself are the cause; nor do we chuse to be the engines GUIDED by you to push the nation down that precipice to the brink of which you have brought her." In short, is there any man's mouth out of which the orator could be more justly condemned than out of his own?

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It is not then credible that his resignation could be the effect of a dissent of which his own departure from that great political principle, the possession of which had made his fortune, was notoriously the cause. Nor is it but observable, that in that anonymous letter the word *fickleness*, with regard to people's " withdrawing " their good opinion from one who has " served his country with *fidelity* and *success*," is studiously and very wisely avoided. It would have been hard indeed for the mob itself to go beyond him in fickleness : neither could any be said to leave him, but he them. As to *fidelity*, I hope he does not mean to his declarations : and as to *success*, it remains I fancy to be proved, whether it ultimately deserves that name or not ; unless he means his own obtainment of an annuity and title in his family.

And now as to the real, not the pretended motive of this resignation, there is a conjecture offered only as a conjecture, the degree of probability of which is entirely submitted to your own knowledge of things. Judge and pronounce.

Weigh

Weigh then with yourself the aspect and situation of things upon the continent, at the time this resignation took place. Consider whether the events expected in Germany were likely to be of a favorable nature. A mischance there might not improbably turn the tide of popularity against the person accusable at least of our share having been so deep as it is in that theatre of all the horrors of a civil war, in which we had originally so little to do. Nay Hanover itself had been offered a neutrality, before the convention was so unfortunately broke. That which arguments, which representations had not been able to do, there was some reason to think that on any untoward accident on the continent, actual feelings would effect; that is to say, open the eyes of an honest and deceived people: a people whose virtues had been originally, through a credulity which was afterwards rivetted by gratitude for bottomless successes, made subservient to their own destruction, and whose indignation could not but be expected the more ardent, whenever it should break out, for their finding what a cruel advantage had been taken against themselves, of their confidence and goodness. He might not think it quite impossible that they should

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make him the scape-goat of those continental measures, which himself has confessed that he "GUIDED," after notoriously pointing them out as the path of perdition.

In the natural dread then of such an event, there offered but one way for him to escape the burst of the storm ; and that was trying how much more imposition the people would bear. That proposal of rushing headlong into a Spanish war carried with it, especially to those who lull themselves with the visionary dreams of rolling in Spanish gold and silver from surprised fleets, or captured galleons, a popular air of spirit and resolution. No matter with what impropriety this motion should come, especially from the person whence it did come. The tub thrown out to the multitude might at least divert their attention from the capital object on the continent, while himself should escape in all the confusion he will have created. Nor is he wholly mistaken. There are doubtless too many of the well-meaning so very prejudice-ridden, that to his leaving his office, those very events will be by them imputed of which his own measures will be the cause, and his own foreseeing that

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they are, humanly speaking, not to be prevented, is his sole motive for leaving his office. And yet what numbers have extolled to the skies those measures, who have already felt, or will most probably in future feel the severe consequences of them, in their property, as well as perhaps in the blood of their dearest relations!

In short, what is there so gross as will not pass upon an infatuated people? It is on that he depends, and I should be very loth to be too sure that he will not meet with his usual *success*. At least, I should not be at all surprised to see him triumphantly riding the blast, and once more mobbed into power; again perched upon the pinnacle, and crowing over king and country. The improbability of such an event, and its tendency to seal the utter perdition of this nation, already in no small jeopardy, are but reasons the more for believing that this event will take place. In short, there is nothing so contradictory that humor and prejudice will not themselves swallow, or attempt to cram down the throats of others. They will, for proofs of a man's steadiness, produce instances of his having three or four times renounced his principles, and of the purity
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of his disinterestedness, his acceptance of an annuity and a title.

For these last however, if he is but half as grateful to the people for their real benefits, as they are to him for his imaginary ones, he owes them a most oratorical address of thanks; since the court's apprehension of their opinion of him, however unaccountably got, and more unaccountably kept after repeated forfeiture, had doubtless no small share in the rewards bestowed on his most invaluable services.

It may however on this occasion not be improper to recommend to the consideration of those happy enough to possess their liberty of judgment, untirannized over by popular prejudice, by particular humor, or by false interest, whether it would not be rather too impolitic for us, in favor of the king of Prussia, whom we might encourage to his ruin but never serve, to shut up all door of reconciliation with those our ancient and natural allies, who have been alienated from us by our espousal of his cause.

Now, would any of them, and especially the court of Vienna, in any occurrence of renewing or treating with us separately from France, the only way of treating with us we ought to wish, upon such a point, for example so infinitely interesting to us, as the guarding the Austrian Netherlands against the French invasion, or their more dangerous insinuation, chuse to have any thing to say to a court "GUIDED" by the very man, who drew our ties so close with its capital enemy? would it chuse to concert measures with the man whose transitions from one point of politics to another diametrically opposite, were so rapid, so ill-timed, so indecent, as to have rather the air of folly than of fickleness, or even of self interest? Besides, that in the transaction of business of state, the figurative stile of tropes, metaphors, and similes, goes for very little. The spirit of affairs is very different from the silly spirit of arrogance and self-sufficiency. Surely the stupidity of worshipping such an one, for a cackle that, instead of preserving the capitol from the enemy, bids much fairer to let him in, is not even exceeded by that of the poor Ostiaks of Siberia, worshipping a brazen goose.

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In the mean while it should not pass quite unremarked, that among the causes which have unhappily contributed to keep up that frantic humor of extolling our great guide for those enterprizes that could only perpetuate our double war and feed perdition, while the eyes of the people were by the false glare of them, taken off from incomparably the superior object on the continent, by which all must be decided; there may be reckoned a dirty, little, partial vein of lucre, of which war in the pecuniary operations it creates, keeps the springs open to a set of people who fatten and thrive amazingly upon the public distresses and dangers.

These are I will not say those of the moneyed in contradistinction to the landed interest, because, I fancy, they may be demonstrated to be at bottom nearly the same; but only those vulturs and extortioners upon the public, who turn their money and their credit in the jobs of the alley, and carry on practices so essentially different from those of the fair merchant, who employs and animates the industry of his countrymen. No: these are such as prey on the vitals of their own country, and accumulate riches disproportioned to the
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the time and pains naturally requisite in the due course of things, and accumulate them in a way reprobated by all wise governments. These succeed not by honest arts, or just dealings, but by low cunning and little vile tricking. It is in short of these that the landed interest have such room to complain, since the security which is afforded by their visible real estates, is made the very bottom upon which these people found their gaming. And a most infamous game it is: since they so palpably and wantonly sport away the welfare and reputation of this country, that any little puff of news, any idle tale, any lie accidental or originally of their own invention, is sufficient to give, at their discretion, to so capital a concern of the state, as the stocks undoubtedly are, a fluctuation, which must very reasonably give ill impressions of the solidity of the stocks to all thinking persons, when they observe them capable of being sunk or raised by means so despicable, and so much beneath their intrinsic importance. Such as these may well join the cry in favor of all that impolicy and unthriftness which subject the nation to the necessity of negotiating to their advantage those immense sums, which are the matter of their gaming: while

while for the payment of such debts (how much in vain incurred !) the landed interest, and the industry of the artist, are not only actually fainting under the burthen, but see no prospect of relief, but rather of its augmentation, till the whole state shall sink under it. It is such as these, or their agents and puffers, that *value* the nation upon its facility of funding and borrowing, in which stile we may then with propriety be said to be WORTH considerably above a hundred millions of debt. But while that facility of borrowing is so much admired, it were to be wished that the necessity or purposes of borrowing had been a little more strictly examined than they appear to have been.

But surely those who have not resolutely set their own reason at defiance, will hardly, upon exercising their own faculty of thinking, in scorn of suffering others to think for them, who have long made a trade and practice of deceiving them, not see how cruelly, how grossly this nation has been “ *guided*,” not only to its own destruction, but to that of those to whom she wished well.

Many nations have madly ruined themselves

selves to ruin their enemies ; but it was reserved for the bedlam-born politics of our illustrious “ *guide*” to exhibit the sad sight of a nation palpably ruining herself to no better purpose than to ruin her friends and allies, and to give her enemies advantages, that must ultimately far, far, overcompensate the losses they might just, at the first flash, sustain by her ; losses more than insignificant to the sum of things, since they are rather the predisposing causes of ultimately superior gain to those very enemies, we have so vainly imagined were to be reduced to the necessity of mumping a peace of us upon their knees, and upon any terms.

Nor are such events in the class of those that, to the “ *guides*” chargeable with them, afford a justification in the difficulty of foreseeing them. Could the madness of our continental connections have escaped those who had not enough considered that point ; with what face can the not seeing that madness be pleaded by the very man who had piqued himself upon his clear-sightedness and penetration for discovering all that pregnancy with destruction in them, which was in truth of itself so obvious ? But precisely when he veered about, the
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the reasons for his perseverance, if a regard for the public had been any thing else but a mere pretext with him, were a thousand times more strong than what they had been at the commencement of his clamor and opposition. The Prussian cause, which had before happily hung so loose that it was not impossible to have shaken it off, was now double-riveted, and for its impolicy, I will not say its injustice, could, in the nature of things, only make ours a bad one; but could never itself by ours be made a good one, taking the word, "good," but in the sense of successful. By this fatal adoption our war was totally transubstantiated, totally changed its own just, noble, fair, and defensible nature. We made ourselves the guarantees of a cause we had never sufficiently examined, and which, in truth, we had no right to examine or judge either, and which we had actually begun by condemning, and by arming the Russians against it. Thus was a false, adulterative, crazy bottom substituted to the true basis of our national politics. And upon so wrong a bottom, is it such a wonder that every thing should in course be wrong even to our very *successes*? Successes which we have too lightly taken for evinced to be real ones, while

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in that adscititious bottom, they self-evidently carry a principle of perdition, unless all Europe should be the inferior object, and our conquests the superior one, which might so well have had their great, their solid value, on any other footing than what they now totter upon.

May they all be found retainable! for surely every unretainable conquest considering the expence of blood and treasure in the atchieving it, and the dishonor and pain of parting with it, is rather in the consequence, a wound received than a wound given; a barbed arrow, not to be extracted without anguish, shame, and perishment of substance.

But should the nation find herself at last indispensably compelled by the united voice of Europe, and by the necessity of circumstances, to give up points that she would disdain to give up, but for superior considerations of her good and perhaps even of her safety, what will be the consequence? An obvious one. The cry of pusillanimity, of cowardice, possibly even of treachery, will be raised by the very man and the deluded admirers of that man, whose levity, whose desertion of his own political

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cal principle, that is to say, if he had any, will have given to those successes, as falsely attributed to him, as they are impudently arrogated by him, that collateral rotten cause of their being worse than only good for nothing ; unless perhaps to perpetuate a war that must consume all profit to be expected from the *immense revenue* of our conquests, and to distress a government that will justly apprehend giving even the shadow of offence to the people. A people whose sensibility of honor, and bravery, renders them respectable ; but who are at the same time but too liable, from their own scorn and disdain of all imposition, not enough to suppose those who are exceptions among them being capable of it. To these they have been so misguided as to give their confidence, and to continue it after the forfeiture of it, to such a point that, not improbably to a man's going out of a post, they will impute such unfavorable incidents as would never have existed, but for his having come into it : while those favourable ones, of which the honor has been given to him, might most probably have taken place without the folly or guilt of giving them a collateral connection that would so much worse than frustrate them.

However, even to those under the most sanguine prepossession in favor of the late guidance of things, some questions may be stated, for *their own* resolving, upon *their own* reflexion and knowledge, that can hardly not lead them to a right sense of things, that is to say, if they are not predetermined against being sincere with themselves, which, by the by, is not a very uncommon, though always a shameful case.

Let any one then reflect, the state of things considered, whether, had we, at the beginning of the war with France, singly ventured to rest the issue on the exertion of the national force, in the naval channel; there has appeared any such superiority of strength in her, allowing even that she had not sent a single man to oppose that miserable diversion we have made in Germany, as needed to make us despair of heartily sickening her of the war; ay, even if Spain had been joined to her. Had our *conquests* too in such case been fewer and less brilliant, can there be a doubt of their being more solid?

Whose fault then was it that the war was not carried on upon that naval plan?
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who was it that "*guided*" us so much *farther* than before, into a land war, upon such terms of a dishonorable subordination, and especially of impolicy, as no records of History can shew any thing approaching to it? Is it for that man then or his adherents to dare to reproach his honest, his innocent countrymen with those distresses and difficulties into which his own desertion of his own tenets, and his hanging the British cause on a rotten thread will have brought them? At least such a man can hardly have more eloquence, and certainly not more effrontery than will be necessary even to the but defending himself; so far from being so much as suffered to take the advantage of attacking others upon that cruel dilemma which himself will have created.

But especially will those who justify the Prussian alliance on the strange principles, of its strengthening us by decreasing our friends, and multiplying our enemies, and upon the false supposition too that we were singly inferior to France, at the commencement of the war, before our debt was so enormously augmented, before that so many of our brave defenders were sent to so little purpose to the butchery on the
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fields of Germany, or to perish yet more cruelly by the distemperature of a foreign climate ; will these, I say, contend for our being now, in a condition to war down all Europe ? Or by what way of reasoning, unless such frantic reasoning were dated from Bedlam, can it be averred that we were *then* inferior to France, and are *now* so incomparably superior to her, as to be ready for undertaking to make head against all Europe, if necessary ; enabled as we are, by that prodigious revenue received or likely soon to be received from our mighty conquests, the “ *important*” Belleisle, the “ *opulent*” Guadaloupe, and the *fertile* Canada, as well as by the number of true and loyal subjects we have made in them ; not to mention the vast accession to our side of those neutral nations whom our politics have filled with “ *amazement*” and “ *veneration*.”

But, alas ! instead of those *successes* having brought us any real augmentation of strength, either actual or reputed, nothing is more likely than that they will furnish one proof more of its being far from impossible for a nation to see its influence and credit diminished, not only in spite of her successes, but even, by her successes,
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while not founded on her own natural, just, and honorable politics. Let us then disdain all false gasconade: all boastful insistence on our hollow successes, with that dissimulation of our disadvantages, incurred by the fault of false guides, which is so much to our own wrong, and to our farther misguidance, especially while it is not yet clear but that the damage done to us by our unnational measures and connections, is already irreparable. But if not irreparable as I hope it will ever be as much beneath British magnanimity to consider them as it ought to be beneath British sagacity not to see difficulties where they really exist, or to mistake the authors of them; the point then will be to wish, and devoutly to expect, the reparation there only from whence it can properly and constitutionally come; from a British king and a British parliament; from a patriot sovereign, assisted by a patriot senate, in contempt of all those little dirty selfish cabals for power and influence which have only served to disgrace the highest offices of the state by bringing into them the men on earth the most unfit for them, to the infinite damage and dishonor of the nation. While at the same time, to a king of any sense or spirit,

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it must give the most mean opinion of mankind, as well as make him blush for having such subjects, on his seeing the most worthless among them impudently taking the lead, and others, without the excuse of want, submitting for some point of vile interest, and that interest a false one, to footman it to their inferiors, to sell, in short themselves and their country, in a manner that made it hard to pronounce whether the stupidity or the infamy of the prostitution was the greatest. A want of spirit that must thin the nation of effective defenders, and fill a court with soft ideots or unessential triflers, without a grain of merit but that of a Cappadocian servility, that would turn the stomach of a man of any sense or taste but to think of it.

If then not to despair of seeing the great national council aid with the most faithful and loyal advice a British king, loved and deserving to be loved for his meaning well to his subjects: if to wish, by their efficacious concurrence, to see things replaced on the good old honest British bottom: if, without the least personal animosity, and with sentiments rather of pity than indignation against even those wretched *guides* who were the authors of

those breaches, to wish a solemn authoritative inquiry; how that spirit came to predominate which has essentially violated the most important article of the *Act of Settlement*; what councils have tended to weaken and impoverish the kingdom by domestic corruption, and to what end that corruption; to what practices have madly wasted the wealth, and blood of the nation, especially in bringing another war upon her hands, as to which she had nothing so well to do as to keep clear of it; how that capitulation at Closter-Seven so devoutly to have been wished by Great Britain came to be broke, and why the neutrality offered to Hanover was rejected; and this retrospect to be made without any malignity towards particular delinquents, but purely to apply the best remedies that cool determinate wisdom may suggest against the pernicious consequences of past measures to the welfare of this country, and to prevent the like in future; if, in short, to wish that that management of affairs, and that only, may take place, which shall be big with the greatest good to this great, this worthy, this respectable, this generous, and much deceived nation, be a crime, it is at the

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least the only crime intended in the foregoing reflections, of which may every word that is not dictated by the purest spirit of well-wishing to this country, be received and treated with all the scorn and indignation not the less due to such as inveighing against false pretences to candor and impartiality in others, must be incomparably the more guilty on their incurring that reproach themselves, for this infamous practice being so stale and so trite an one!

I am,

S I R,

Yours, &c.



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[Faint, illegible handwriting, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]